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Levinson: Will the New Federalism Be the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court?

WILL THE NEW FEDERALISM BE THE LEGACY
OF THE REHNQUIST COURT?
Rosalie Berger Levinson*
Although we focus this afternoon on the Rehnquist Court, many
have suggested that the real legacy of the Rehnquist Court is
“O’Connorism.” Justice O’Connor’s approach has dominated because
she is the one who set forth the constitutional standards to govern future
cases.
Her “undue burden” test now governs abortion,1 her
“endorsement test,” which acknowledges that government-sponsored
religion may threaten religious liberty, governs the Establishment
Clause;2 and her position that affirmative action should be subject to a
test that is strict in theory, but not fatal in fact, led a majority of the Court
to sustain Michigan Law School’s diversity program as a necessary,
narrowly-tailored racial preference.3 These are all rulings from which
Justice Rehnquist dissented. He did not succeed in overruling Roe v.
Wade,4 eliminating affirmative action,5 or in getting prayer back into
schools, graduation ceremonies, or football games.6 Indeed, during his
last terms, the liberal faction prevailed in several key cases—abolishing
the death penalty for juvenile offenders7 and striking down state sodomy
laws8 as well as some government displays of the Ten Commandments.9

This speech was given on October 19, 2005, as part of a panel discussion on “The
Legacy of the Rehnquist Court” held at Valparaiso University School of Law. Many of the
views expressed by fellow panelist, Notre Dame Law Professor Richard W. Garnett, who
clerked for Justice Rehnquist during the 1995–1996 Term, are presented in his 2003 article
entitled The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (2003).
1
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (adopting Justice O’Connor’s “no
endorsement” analysis as a general guide in Establishment Clause cases).
3
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
4
In Casey, 505 U.S. 833, the majority refused to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Subsequently, in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930–31 (2000), it invalidated a state’s ban
on partial birth abortions.
5
In Grutter, 536 U.S. 306, O’Connor delivered the opinion holding that race may be
used as a factor in the student admissions program at the University of Michigan Law
School because such was narrowly tailored to serve the school’s compelling interest in
having a diverse student body.
6
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that the school’s
football prayer policy was invalid); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that the
inclusion of clerical members who offered prayers as part of an official school graduation
ceremony was inconsistent with the religion clauses of the First Amendment).
7
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting the execution of juveniles).
8
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning a criminal sodomy statute as
infringing fundamental privacy rights).
*
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On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Justice Rehnquist
presided over a major shift in U.S. law from the liberal Warren Court,
and much of the conservative agenda was accomplished in the name of
one overriding doctrine—federalism. It is fair to say that the Rehnquist
Court’s most contentious legacy is a series of decisions handed down in
the name of federalism.10 Although the term refers to maintaining a
proper balance between state and federal power, to the Rehnquist Court
it has meant reigning in Congress and restoring power to the states. As
explained by Justice O’Connor, one of its key proponents, “a healthy
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front . . . . In the tension
between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.”11 Arguably,
fulfilling the promise of liberty could describe the legacy of the Warren
Court, but the Rehnquist Court decisions demonstrate that the “New
Federalism” has not furthered this liberty-enhancing goal. To the
contrary, federalism has been invoked to narrowly construe
constitutional rights and to limit Congress’ power to enact laws that
protect individual rights.
First, it is noteworthy that the Rehnquist Court “overturned more
acts of Congress than all previous Supreme Courts combined.”12 This
has been an extremely judicially active Court, and a recurring theme has
been the need to curb Congress’ lawmaking authority. In 1993, Justice
Scalia taught a course on Separation of Powers, where he expressed this
same disdain for the “800 pound gorilla,” as he not–so-affectionately
9
McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 25 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (holding that the display
of large, framed copies of the Ten Commandments on the walls of the courthouse for an
ostensibly religious purpose violated the Establishment Clause); cf. Van Orden v. Perry, 125
S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (holding that the display of the Ten Commandments on the Texas State
Capitol grounds together with seventeen other monuments and twenty-one historical
markers did not violate the Establishment Clause).
10
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002) (describing the Rehnquist Court’s
federalism revolution); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: Forward: We the
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 129 (2001) (discussing the “revolution” in federalism doctrine).
11
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–59 (1991). In 1971, Justice Black referred to
“Our Federalism” as the belief that the “National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways” and the federal government should conduct itself in a manner that will not “unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44
(1971).
12
Martha Neil, Cases & Controversies, 91 A.B.A. J. 38, 41 (2005) (quoting legal historian
Joel Grossman); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005
(noting that between 1995 and 2003 the Rehnquist Court struck down thirty-three federal
laws on constitutional grounds, doing so at a higher annual rate than any court in
American history).
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referred to Congress.13 During the Roberts confirmation hearings, a
sharp exchange ensued between Senator Arlen Specter and nominee
Roberts in which Senator Specter asserted that he and other members of
Congress took umbrage at the Court’s recent treatment of congressional
legislation. Specter accused the Court of failing to give appropriate
deference to congressional findings and its determinations as to what
was in the best interests of the country. Specter asked Justice Roberts if
he would continue this malevolent trend. As with so many questions,
the nominee deftly skirted the issue.14
The Rehnquist Court’s federalism has been invoked to restrict
congressional authority to enact laws under two constitutional
provisions: the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. I
will briefly discuss each in turn. In 1995, in United States v. Lopez,15 the
Supreme Court, for the first time in decades, struck down an act of
Congress as falling outside of its Commerce Clause authority. Prior to
Lopez, the Court had explicitly stated that it had gotten out of the
federalism business. In the 1985 decision of Garcia v. San Antonio Metro
Transit Authority,16 the majority ruled that if there was any limitation on
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, it would stem from
the political process, rather than judicial review of the result of the
process.17 States were sufficiently represented in Congress, and thus the
Court would not override its legislation in the name of state sovereignty.
Justice Rehnquist dissented from this opinion, boldly asserting his
confident belief that the principle of state sovereignty would “in time
again command the support of a majority of this Court.”18 His
prediction became reality with the appointments of Justice Antonin
Scalia and later Justice Clarence Thomas.19
The 1995 landmark Lopez case involved the validity of an act of
Congress that prohibited possession of a gun within 1,000 feet of a
school. The Supreme Court, perhaps understandably, found no link
between the possession of guns near schools and interstate commerce
13
Justice Scalia made these remarks in a course on Separation of Powers that he taught
in Cambridge, England, in the summer of 1993.
14
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to be Chief Justice of the
United States Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 299–302 (2005).
15
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
16
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
17
Id. at 556.
18
Id. at 580. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19
Justice Antonin Scalia was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1986, the same year
Justice Rehnquist became Chief Justice. Justice Clarence Thomas ascended to the Court in
1991.
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and thus ruled the act unconstitutional, arguing that criminal law should
be a subject for state, not federal, control.20 This decision did not really
implicate individual liberty—by prohibiting dual layers of criminal
sanctions, the Court did not adversely affect anyone’s individual liberty.
Lopez, however, was alarming because many civil rights laws, including
some criminal provisions, were enacted under the theory that Congress’
Commerce Clause power was plenary.
Laws prohibiting race
discrimination in public accommodations, restaurants, and hotels,21 as
well as laws prohibiting race, gender, and religious discrimination by
private employers22 were enacted under the theory that discrimination
adversely affects interstate commerce and thus may be proscribed. The
fear that Lopez heralded a new, narrower interpretation of Commerce
Clause power was realized in a 2000 decision, United States v. Morrison.23
The Court invalidated significant portions of the Violence Against
Women Act, reasoning that Congress failed to demonstrate a sufficient
link between domestic and other forms of violence against women and
interstate commerce.24 Despite volumes of congressional findings
demonstrating that violence against women may substantially deter
women from engaging in activities that affect interstate commerce, that
sexual assault was costing our economy billions of dollars in terms of
lost productivity, and that states were not taking crimes against women,
especially domestic violence, seriously, the Court found that Congress
had no authority to enact this law.25
The greatest challenge to individual liberty, however, came from the
Rehnquist Court’s decisions invalidating civil rights laws enacted not
under the Commerce Clause, but under the Fourteenth Amendment,
which guarantees equality and due process. The fact that Congress
would use the Commerce Clause to enact civil rights legislation, rather
than the arguably more appropriate and logical Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a historical anomaly. A nineteenth
century Supreme Court decision interpreted the Enforcement Clause, i.e.,
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to permit Congress to reach
only discrimination by government and not private individuals.26 Thus,
Congress in the 1960s turned instead to the broadly and expansively
interpreted Commerce Clause provision. However, when Congress
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/2

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Id. at 618.
Id. at 615.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

Levinson: Will the New Federalism Be the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court?

2006]

Legacy of the Rehnquist Court

593

seeks to hold government responsible for its own discrimination, it has
traditionally enjoyed broad power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Indeed, Justice Rehnquist himself proclaimed in a 1976 decision that
“[w]hen Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative
authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is
exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional
Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody
limitations on state authority.”27 He observed that the Fourteenth
Amendment “quite clearly contemplates limitations on [state]
authority”28 and represents a “shift in the federal-state balance . . . .”29 In
short, principles of federalism or state sovereignty that might otherwise
be an obstacle to congressional authority evaporate when Congress seeks
to enforce the Civil War Amendments because these amendments were
specifically designed to expand federal power and intrude upon state
sovereignty.
This was the understanding until 1997. In that year, in City of Boerne
v. Flores,30 the Court ruled that Congress exceeded its power under the
Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993.31 In this Act, Congress sought, by an overwhelming
majority, to restore religious liberty by overturning a Supreme Court
decision that significantly restricted the rights of religious minorities.32
The Supreme Court had held in a 1990 ruling that the Free Exercise
Clause guarantees no protection from “neutral” laws; no matter how
much a state law burdened religious practices, it would be upheld
provided it was simply rational.33 Congress sought to restore the strict
scrutiny test previously used for laws that substantially burdened free
exercise rights.
Despite 800 pages in the Congressional Record
documenting the difficulty minority faiths have had in securing
exemption from facially neutral laws, the Court ruled that Congress
exceeded its Section 5 power.34 The Act was neither “congruent” nor
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
Id. at 453.
29
Id. at 455.
30
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
31
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
32
The House voted unanimously, and all but three senators endorsed this Act. 139
CONG. REC. S14461–01 (dailey ed., Oct. 27, 1993).
33
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Justice Scalia
acknowledged that his rational basis test would place religious minorities at the mercy of
the political process, but he blithely concluded that discriminatory treatment was an
“unavoidable consequence of democratic government.” Id. at 890.
34
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530–32 (discussing the extensive Congressional Record in support
of RFRA as compared to the truncated record of the Voting Rights Act).
27
28
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“proportionate” to the supposed remedial objective, and thus it intruded
“into the States’ traditional prerogatives” to regulate.35
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, as the title implies, was a
direct slam on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause of the Constitution—the majority in Boerne called it an affront to
Marbury v. Madison36 itself.37 As so understood, Boerne could have been a
constitutional blip, a warning to Congress that it should not pass inyour-face restoration laws.38 However, the principle that acts of
Congress must pass a rigid “congruent and proportionality” test
threatened other civil rights provisions enacted under the Fourteenth
Amendment to expand individual liberty. Indeed, in 2000, the Supreme
Court, for the first time in fifty years, invalidated portions of a major
federal civil rights statute, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”). It ruled that Congress exceeded its authority under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment in subjecting state employers to money
damages for making age-biased employment decisions.39 One year later,
Justice Rehnquist authored an opinion holding that state employees
could not recover money damages for violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) because Congress had failed to sufficiently
document a pattern of disability discrimination by the states so as to
warrant this intrusion on state sovereignty.40 In enacting the ADA,
Congress made detailed findings of pervasive discrimination against the
disabled in both the private and public sectors, but the Court nonetheless
held that the Act failed the congruent and proportionality test.41
Similarly, the Court ruled that, to the extent the Violence Against
Women Act had as its source not just the Commerce Clause, but Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it lacked the required congruence and
proportionality, and thus it was invalid.42

Id. at 533–34.
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
37
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. The Senate Report that accompanied RFRA strongly criticized
Smith, contending that the framers of the Constitution recognized free exercise of religion
as an inalienable right and that “[b]y lowering the level of constitutional protection for
religious practices, the decision has created a climate in which the free exercise of religion is
jeopardized.” S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993). Further, the statute listed as its purpose:
“[T]o restore the compelling interest test as set forth” in earlier decisions. § 2000bb(b)(1).
38
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Anti-Discrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 461 (2000) (asserting that the
Supreme Court was clearly provoked by the temerity of Congress in enacting RFRA).
39
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–83 (2000).
40
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
41
Id. at 374.
42
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626–27 (2000).
35
36
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The whole purpose of federalism, as Justice O’Connor explained,43 is
to ensure against federal tyranny by dividing power between state and
federal governments. However, if Congress is expanding individual
rights, is there any reason to fear tyranny? Further, federalism is
promoted because it purportedly infuses power into state and local
government, which is closer to the people and thus more likely to be
responsive to their needs. Yet, in enacting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, the Violence Against Women Act, the ADEA, and the
ADA, Congress was acknowledging that the majoritarian processes on
the state and local level had failed to be responsive to the needs of the
aged, the disabled, religious minorities, and battered women. The
Court’s reliance on federalism thus appears suspect.44 Rather than being
liberty enhancing, the decisions appear to simply promote a conservative
agenda—the same agenda reflected in a series of decisions narrowly
interpreting other key civil rights provisions. Congress’ response was to
enact the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the goal of which was to overturn
some seven or eight Rehnquist Court rulings that had reduced
individual protection from discrimination by narrowly construing civil
rights laws.45 During this same time frame, the Court limited free speech
rights of students, lessened the protection of criminal defendants,
abdicated its role in ensuring school desegregation and prison
improvements, increased restrictions on affirmative action programs,
and decreased protection for minority religious beliefs.46

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has observed that the Court’s purported concern for
states’ rights is ignored when businesses challenge state regulation on preemption
grounds: “States’ rights challenges to federal civil rights laws win; businesses’ challenges
to state business regulations win. Civil rights plaintiffs lose and business plaintiffs win. Is
that really a federalism principle or is that just a description of a greatly conservative
Court?” Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Discussion: A Focus on Federalism, 20 TOURO L. REV. 909,
922 (2005).
45
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Congress listed
among its purposes for the Act, “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by
expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection
to victims of discrimination.” Id. at 1071.
46
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that strict
scrutiny, rather than the previously followed intermediate scrutiny, was the required
standard of review for congressionally-mandated affirmative action programs); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that educators may exercise broad
editorial control over the contents of a high school newspaper and may freely censor
student articles based on a finding of legitimate pedagogical objectives); see also Rosalie B.
Levinson, The Dark Side of Federalism in the Nineties: Restricting Rights of Religious Minorities,
33 VAL. U. L. REV. 47 (1998) (arguing that federalism has been used to restrict the rights of
religious minorities).
43
44
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There was only one ruling in which the Court ignored federalism,
purportedly in favor of individual rights. The Rehnquist Court did step
in to stop Florida from performing a recount of presidential ballots,
thereby handing George Bush the White House.47 As the dissent opined
in Bush v. Gore,48 “[w]ere the other members of this Court as mindful as
they generally are of our system of dual sovereignty, they would affirm
the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.”49 They would have
followed the core federalism principle that mandates deference to state
courts on matters of state law. Georgetown University Law Professor
Mark Tushnet has commented: “From the public point of view and from
the historian’s point of view, it’s almost certain that Bush v. Gore will be
the case of the Rehnquist court.”50 If the partisan split in Gore is the
legacy of the Rehnquist Court, it is a legacy that has likely contributed to
what has been described as a crisis in the judiciary. Recently released
public polls show that the majority of Americans lack confidence in the
integrity and independence of the Court.51 Proposals have circulated
that would eliminate life tenure in favor of fixed terms for federal judges,
including Supreme Court Justices, because they have blithely ignored
their own precedents and principles.52 But I will leave this discussion for
another day.
So is the New Federalism the legacy of the Rehnquist Court? Two
years ago I would have ended my remarks on federalism at this point.
However, as my students know, interpretation of the Constitution is an
evolving process, and a few recent decisions suggest that the New
Federalism may already be waning, both as a restriction on Congress’
power under the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Commerce
Clause. In a 2003 decision, Justice Rehnquist himself rejected the
federalism argument and ruled that Congress acted within its authority
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in subjecting state

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Id.
49
Id. at 142–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
50
Joan Biskupic, Rehnquist Left Supreme Court with Conservative Legacy, USA TODAY, Sept.
9, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/supremecourt
justices/2005-09-04-rehnquist_legacy_x.htm (quoting Professor Mark Tushnet).
51
Martha Neil, Half of U.S. Sees “Judicial Activism Crisis,” A.B.A. J. EREPORT, Sept. 30,
2005, http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/s30survey.html. The survey reported that
a majority agreed with the statement that “‘judicial activism’ ha[d] reached the crisis stage,
and that judges who ignore voters’ values should be impeached.” Further, nearly one-half
agreed with a congressman who said judges are “arrogant, out-of-control and
unaccountable.”
52
See Benjamin Wittes, Without Precedent, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1, 2005, at 39.
47
48
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employers to damage actions under the Family Medical Leave Act.53
Justice Rehnquist viewed this as a valid prophylactic measure intended
to eliminate gender-based discrimination in the workplace, and he ruled
that the Act met the stringent congruence and proportionality test.
Federalism was rejected in two other decisions, although both were
over Justice Rehnquist’s dissent. One case again involved the ADA. As I
noted, the Supreme Court ruled that state employers could not be sued
for violating the ADA. Nonetheless, in Tennessee v. Lane,54 it held that the
ADA was a valid exercise of Congress’ power as applied to cases
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts. Thus, a
paraplegic who was denied wheelchair access to a second story
courtroom in a Tennessee building that lacked an elevator could sue the
state for damages. The ADA trumped state sovereignty because court
access is a fundamental right.55
In a second case rejecting federalism, the Court ruled that Congress
had authority under the Commerce Clause to criminalize the possession
of marijuana even when grown within a state for personal, in-state
medicinal use.56 The federal criminal drug law came into direct conflict
with California’s medical marijuana statute. Despite arguments that
imposition of the federal drug laws in this context invaded states’ rights
and that any link to interstate commerce was too attenuated, the majority
turned to the more traditional understanding of the Commerce Clause to
sustain the law. It reasoned that Commerce Clause authority included
the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, even as
applied to the troubling facts of this case where seriously ill patients
would suffer significant harm.57 In a bizarre twist, the dissenting
conservatives lamented the betrayal of federalism—they would not have
allowed federal agents to raid the homes of sick people and seize their
homegrown marijuana.58
Obviously, the liberal Justices felt that
sustaining Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause was
paramount, despite this compelling picture of government invading
individual liberty.

Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
541 U.S. 509 (2004).
55
Id. at 532–34.
56
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
57
Id. at 2209.
58
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented. Id.
at 2220–39.
53
54
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Notwithstanding these new cases, I believe the reports of the demise
of the New Federalism are a bit premature. The 800 pound gorilla will
not roam freely, nor will Congress have unbridled authority. Difficult
questions regarding federalism and the proper role of Congress in
enacting laws under the Commerce Clause and under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment remain—indeed the Roberts Court faces some
of these questions this term.59 I have no doubt that the Rehnquist
Court’s federalism legacy will continue to influence the debate on these
pending cases and on future cases for years to come.

59
In Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1299 (2005), the
Court will determine whether the Attorney General permissibly construed the Controlled
Substances Act to prohibit distribution of federally controlled substances for purposes of
facilitating an individual’s suicide, despite state law purporting to authorize such
distribution. [Subsequent to the date of this lecture, the Court found that the Attorney
General lacked authority under the Controlled Substances Act. 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).] In
Goodman v. Georgia, 120 Fed. App’x 785 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 2266 (2005), the
Court will decide whether the ADA was a proper exercise of Congress’ power as applied to
the administration of state prison systems, such that inmates with disabilities may sue for
damages to rectify discrimination by state-operated prisons.
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